Political Science > Global Challenges

 

In the second half of the semester we looked at some of the global challenges we have to face today. I will discuss three articles in this paper, beginning with The Future of AIDS by Nicholas Eberstadt. I will then continue with the next subject, which is the question of genocide and mass killing as Benjamin A. Valentino sees it. I will conclude with the problem of weakening and failing states and what can be done to deal with them.

As I mentioned before the first topic I wish to discuss is the AIDS problem in Asia. The two opposing views that I will compare and contrast in this section are the opinion of Nicholas Eberstadt and the opinion of those that think he over exaggerates the situation. Eberstadt in his work, The Future of AIDS paints a picture that is more than frightening. After this devastating disease swept through Africa, killing millions of people, its next destination might be Eurasia. He discusses three countries in particular, China, India and Russia, and discovers the major factors contributing to the spread of AIDS in each country. The numbers he gives are unimaginably high, but probably true regarding the sub-Saharan Africa. He says that according to 2001 data, more than 28 million HIV carriers lived in that region, and more than 2 million of them die yearly. One of the major reasons of the disease being so wide spread and mortal is the lack of international attention according to Eberstadt. He warns us that this may happen in Asia as well if the international community lets it get out of hand. The truth is that already several measures with more or less success were implemented in many Asian countries to prevent the AIDS epidemic.

As of 2001 there were more than 7 million HIV carriers in the region, and this number is expected to grow rapidly, as the author sees it. This may not be the case however. For example the Chinese government has already done some of the necessary steps to control the epidemic. Many of the illegal blood clinics were shot down, but many of these measures are little more difficult to enforce on the waste country sides. In bigger cities the epidemic has already been slowed down thank to the new measures. Part of the truth is that the Chinese government had long denied the problem, but for international pressure they decided to start acting. It seems that the author disregards the fact that the government had amended certain laws regarding epidemics in the country, and that it is somewhat successful enforcing those laws. Therefore it is unlikely that the number of HIV carriers will grow at a rate of 20-30 percent a year. According to some estimates the number of HIV carriers living currently in China is somewhere between 800,000 and 6 millions. Let’s hope the number is closer to the lower end. Anyway, as Eberstadt continues his argument by taking the 20-30 percent growth rate into account, he calculates that the “number of victims could double in 30 months”(30).Well, this article was written in 2002, so we could take a look at what’s the case in China today, about 30 months later. But he shouldn’t forget that the Chinese government started acting only about a few years ago, and that it can still do a lot to stop the epidemic. It was in 2003 when we witnessed significant improvement on behalf of the government, this is when they started spending more money on health education, and accepted money from foreign countries. As wee see the role of the international community is very important when it comes to pressuring foreign governments to act.

Let’s look at now how he sees the AIDS epidemic and its future in Russia and India. The numbers are alarming, but, again, he seems to overestimate the rate of growth. He mentions the mains reasons of the spread of the disease, and sees too few actions from the governments beside denial. After the fall of communism Russia opened up to western ideas and culture, but it meant importing the bad things too, such as prostitution and drug use. Among these people we see the highest number of HIV infections. Another problem is Russia’s prison system, where there are more than 1 million detainees at any given time. Many of them can be considered HIV carriers. But this problem is not unsolvable either. Eberstadt doesn’t mention it, but international pressure and light sanctions can go a long way in influencing policy makers. As the economy is predicted to grow, the health care and education system will get better providing a healthier and more educated citizenry. All are enemies of the AIDS epidemic.

India’s case might be the most problematic. In 2001 there were an estimated 4 million HIV carriers in the country. Many of them are prostitutes, drug users or homosexuals. The biggest problem is that “people are still reluctant to discuss behavior that contributes to the spread of the disease” (28). And in this case, the author might be right in his forecast of the extent of the epidemic, since the Indian government has done close to nothing to solve this issue. We can be sure, however that the international community will do everything they can to help change the minds of those in power.

According to Eberstadt the future of the AIDS epidemic in Asia will parallel that of Africa’s. There are many who don’t think this will be the case. There are measures already put in action in China, and Russia can count on international support as well. This epidemic will probably not be a pandemic as some suggest, but we can’t sit back and watch the issue solving itself with the help of only the national governments.

The second issue I’d like to discuss is the possibility of the prevention of a mass genocide in third world countries. The essay “Still Standing By: Why America and the International Community Fail to Prevent Genocide and Mass Killing”, written by Benjamin A. Valentino gives us an opportunity to gain some inside of the Rwanda and other genocides as well. The 1994 Rwanda genocide presents an interesting and instructive topic as to why neither the United States nor the international community failed and fails to take action. I will give a short background of the Hutu-Tutsi rivalry, followed by presenting the pros and cons why UN and the USA didn’t intervene in the country.

There is a long history of conflict between the two ethnic groups of Rwanda. What is an ethnic group? It is a group of people sharing the same culture, religion, history and culture. Race is often not a dividing factor; moreover ethnic groups don’t seek political power and self-determination. One of the reasons the international community is failed to act in Rwanda is that they all thought it will only be a continuation or reemergence of the civil war. Is this a legitimate reason? The author doesn’t think so. One of the many proofs he mentions is the infamous “genocide fax”, sent by General Romeo Dallaire to the UN headquarters. In his report, the general warns the UN of the possibility of a mass killing based on what he observed in the country. He noticed the transfer of a large quantity of armaments in Rwanda in addition to the return of an escalated hatred between the two ethnic groups. His report of course wasn’t acted upon. UN officials thought that the civil war between Tutsis and Hutus is about to reemerge and there is little they can do. They perceived the conflict as a simply but forceful gut hatred between the two, and knew that it is almost impossible to change the way they perceive each other. In addition the UN was in the process of rebuilding the nation and not to prevent a mass killing. But according to Valentino it is a big mistake to trying to distinguish between civil war and genocide. What they didn’t realize is that genocide was only a “tactic” in the civil war (568).

To go further, some even blame the Arusha treaty that was sponsored by the UN for the genocide. This peace agreement gave a disproportionably large influence to the minority Tutsis both in the transactional parliament and in the military. Even though the moderate Hutus were prepared to accept this agreement, the extremists would never have done so. The perceived injustices of this agreement is said to fuel the Hutus and drove them to the killings of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis. I think it would be a mistake to blame the whole conflict on this one factor. Instead the international community should learn to intervene with more caution in the future to avoid similar consequences.

As I mentioned before, the international community had several warnings of what was about to take place in Rwanda. Many of the several reasons that stopped them from intervening were that they thought at worst it will be a reawaking of the civil war. Another reason is that they had a hard time imagining that genocide would take place. It still seems like a wild idea nonetheless it is what happened. What’s more, it wasn’t the first and last occasion in history. So why was it so hard to imagine when there were a number of intelligence reports supporting it.? Was it the fear of losing American troops? The Clinton administration seemed to have learnt from the Somali incident where twelve peace keepers were left dead. They couldn’t afford the death of more Americans, or else the public would’ve viewed them in an unfavorable light.

There seem to be a number of reasons why the UN and the US didn’t intervene in Rwanda. The next one is that it would’ve taken at least four weeks to mobilize military forces in Rwanda, and so by that time the genocide was almost over. But we shouldn’t ignore that fact that warning signs had been sent well before the killings took place. General Dallaire notified Brussels, and the US Defense Intelligence Agency had been receiving credible information as well. So to say that there wasn’t enough time to mobilize is to say not believing the reports that came from the region. True, if the military preparation would have began when the first news arrived about the genocide, it would have been too late. But the truth is that it never began. I think that even if only a hundred lives could have been saved it would defer future attempt to mass kill an ethnic group anywhere in the world.

Valentino argues that the lessons learnt from the Rwanda genocide are discouraging because this would’ve been a relatively easy case for intervention (573). The warning signs were clear, the reports credible and timely, and the number of those committing the genocide were relatively small. So the odds of stopping the Rwanda genocide were fairly high. The most noteworthy obstacles in intervening in the region might be its geographical location and the speed the genocide took place. The international community should nonetheless learn from its mistakes and put in place an early warning system that enables them to prevent future ethnic cleansing.

What a weakening state is, what constitutes to state failure, and how to help their rebuilding is the next topic of my discussion paper. Of course, as in any other case, opinions regarding this subject can be different, if not straight out opposing. How to react to failing states and governments, what, if anything the international community can do to prevent failure and how to start the recovery process are all important questions.

Let me first discuss what a weakening and a failed state is. Failed states, such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Somalia are “Incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within their own borders, leaving their territories governmentally empty. In other worlds they are not capable of defending themselves from within or without. Failed states can become politically instable, but most importantly provide safe haven to terrorist organizations. This latter aspect is the major reason why the international community today should pay attention to weakening and failed states. A weakening state is one where territorial control is relatively extensive, but is not capable of providing public goods to its citizens. North Korea, Syria or Zimbabwe are all considered weakening states. In addition the government is becoming more and more autocratic and the regime that has one leader is less tolerant toward its opponents. There are also economic signs of a state weakness, and those can be seen in high unemployment rates, high inflation, shortage of foreign currency and plummeting productivity among others.

It is important to recognize the dangers a failed state can impose on its neighbors or on the larger community. It can cause mass migration that puts an enormous burden on its neighbors destabilizing them too. The US in the past several times helped this problem by providing temporary accommodation, food and clothing. Diseases can be spread such as malaria and AIDS due to the absent of basic hygienic elements. Weak borders can encourage weapons and human trafficking further destabilizing the region.

Without question, the international community has to help weakening and failed states in the rebuilding process. Some may not realize but by helping them restore order, there is a possibility to teach them western democratic practices. These states may also serve as strategic allies due to their geographic location. Every national government has to protect its people and if they’re not capable of doing it, the international community has to do it. Some may cite state sovereignty as a reason not to do so. But I think state independence is less important than the well-being of its citizens. Prior to the 1990s not much attention was paid to failing states, but since then many realized that states need help. This process has escalated even more after 9/11 when the US and others realized failed states can be safe harbors for terrorists. So I think I made my case for foreign intervention in failed states.

How to intervene and in what phase of their failure is another question. The author discusses the attitude of international community toward Zimbabwe’s Mugabe. There is a lot of lessons to be learnt from this case. Rotberg realizes that the only way to intervene in a failing state is through “international political will.” In other words diplomacy can go a long way in convincing the leadership or leader of a country. The first challenge in intervening might be to realize that there is a problem with a state. According to the author, “quiet diplomacy” (134) should be the next step, and if that doesn’t work, public criticism may do the job. Some say smart sanctions can persuade too, that is to stop giving economic aid. In the past, as we saw in India, the international community may ban the travel of leaders and can freeze their bank accounts. Another method of expressing disagreement with a country’s policy is to suspend it from international organizations. So argue that if these sanctions were in place in countries such as Uganda or Nigeria, the destructions could have been minimized. Also to criticize autocratic leaders publicly would make UN peacekeepers and relief missions unnecessary (135).

In Zimbabwe, the international community was reluctant to do anything at all until it was too late. Members of the South African Development Community didn’t publicly criticize Mugabe. The UN and the US actually expressed their dislike, but did nothing in terms of sanctioning the country. Mugabe successfully destroyed the economic and political fabric of the nation (135). What came next could be a schoolbook example of driving a country into total failure. By the time the presidential elections in 2002, he employed violence against his opponents, he bombed newspapers, and failed to carry out court decisions. In the meantime Mugabe ignored all kind of quiet diplomacy, and didn’t respond to any pressures by the UN. Only when it was too late, did the UN and the US impose sanctions and isolated Mugabe. Had they intervened earlier, there would have been a chance to turn around the nation.

The case of Zimbabwe could be an example to those who think that international intervention in weakening states is necessary to help those countries. Diplomacy and smart sanctions should work for the benefit of the citizens, and ignorance will only result in a state failure. If however a country completely failed, there is a need for rebuilding as we see in Afghanistan. Some say that failed states can’t be helped, but the author brings up clear reasons as why it’s not true. Countries that have been successfully helped or being helped are Tajikistan, Lebanon, Cambodia and East Timor. These stand as a proof that with international help, failed states can recover. By providing them with security, training bureaucrats, and helping the transactional government, can provide the necessary backbone for the rebuilding. But as it’s been proven, short-term fixes will not withstand, only a long-standing commitment will solve the problems.

To those who question the right of the international community to get involved in failing states we can prove that it is possible, even necessary to do so. A timely and effective interference can save the nations economic and political system, but most importantly human lives. Dictators pose a real thereat not only to their nations but to their immediate neighbors and to the international community as well by destabilizing the region and providing safe haven for terrorists. The major points I discussed in this paper was the HIV-AIDS problem in Asia, and we can conclude that the author paints a picture that is darker than the reality. In the next section I discussed the problem of genocide and the necessity of an international intervention in order to save lives. My last subject was the weakening and failed states, how to realize the problems in a country and how the international community should sanction and treat those countries.

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