Political Science > Globalization as a Political Force

Articles discussed:

Benjamin Valentino: “Still Standing By: Why America and the International Community Fail to Prevent Genocide and Mass Killing”
Nicholas Eberstadt: “The Future of AIDS”
Robert Rotberg: “Failed States in a World of Terror”

There are many who on one hand blindly oppose, while others accept the idea of globalization without knowing what it exactly means. It is not an easy task to define its meaning since globalization is more like a compelling force than something simply and objectively classifiable. A widely known definition is that globalization is a global market place of ideas and it leads to the spread of consumerism, furthermore world economies today are designed to satisfy these consumer needs. Globalizing nations are also more likely to adopt democratic values as they manifest in government and economic policies. National elections, government responsibility and honoring civil rights are all democratic values. But as Kenneth N. Waltz puts it: “Associating interdependence with democracy and prosperity is nothing new.” What we see today is only the second wave of globalization, one that began in the early 1980s. The first time globalization occurred was in the late 1880s through the beginning of World War I; some say it ended in 1915; right after the Germans torpedoed the Lusitania. In this paper I will describe the opposing views regarding the spread of democracy as appears in the articles by Michael McFaul and Thomas Carothers. In the followings I will give an overview of the practical battle of the globalizer and non-globalizer camps as John Campbell sees it, and I will end with how globalization affected our society according to Benjamin Barber, John Micklethwait and Adrian Woodbridge.

As democracy is considered an essential building block in the spread of globalization, it is important to look at the differences in views considering the promotion of democracy as a world value. Michael McFaul and Thomas Carothers convincingly describe both sides of the coin. Let’s look at what McFaul says in this matter. He points out that today democracy enjoys the acceptance of the majority of the world. It is an internationally accepted norm with a universal legitimacy. It has been embraced by more and more countries, and is continued to be the prevailing world view. His statistic supports his observation. McFaul points out that while in 1972 there were only 43 countries classified as free by the Freedom House, this number grew to 89 by around 2002. 38 countries were partly free, and 69 not free at all in 1972. Thirty years later these numbers were 56 and 47 respectively. He admits that despite impressive gains in democratic values, a fairly large part of the world still remains partly or not free at all. Carothers looks at the issue from a different point of view. He looks at the data of 1996 and 2004 and states that eight years later there were 118 electoral democracies in the world, while this number today is 117. So not only the number of democratic states is not growing, actually it’s declining. The huge jump between 1972 and 2002 in the number of free nations can be explained with the collapse of the dictatorship in Portugal, the rise of democracies both in the former Soviet block and South America.

McFaul also argues that there isn’t really another valid alternative to democracy. The only other government form that could challenge democracy is the Bin-Ladenism. It is not a real alternative to democracy, and if it were to gain momentum, it would happen on the Middle-East. True, that in the last century other options existed, such as communism and fascism, but these ideologies have failed miserably. Communist regimes are still in power in a few countries, such as China and Vietnam, but their rulers claim that they are no longer opposed to democracy, in fact Chinese leaders are already started to move toward democracy. For most countries, affirms McFaul then, “democracy is either a practice or a stated goal.” He continues by stating that another vital competition to democracy was the modernizing autocrat, as we saw in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. They all sustained a steady growth of 9% annually. For a while they challenged the democratic model as a better performing economic alternative in the developing world. This development was achievable only through a temporary trade-off between democracy and development. In contrast Carothers points out the maybe democracy is not an essential component of economic success; actually quite a few authoritarian countries have been doing pretty well in recent years. This was the prevailing view in the 1960s and 1970s, but in the 1990s the opposite idea gained international ground. Democracy is essential to economic development and this view was supported by the fact that the postcommunist world was developing at a high rate. So than how does China come into the picture? Its dictatorial regime produces an exceptional sustained economic growth, and this system is copied by other authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries, including Russia, Ukraine and Vietnam. This trend fuels the belief in the developing world that often a strong hand is needed to cultivate economic development. The following section will further discuss differences between the globalizers and non-globalizers.

Now I’d like to go to my next subject, which will be described through the two articles, Jihad vs. McWorld and The Globalization Backlash. Jihad vs. McWorld is an interesting article, very unusual in its approach to describing the two major forces in today’s international scene. He says there are two possible political figurers and neither one is democratic. While McWorld might be the better alternative of the two, it isn’t really desirable either since it doesn’t promote democracy. It only leads to an interdependence of the nations; it creates a borderless world with international citizens. Its centripetal forces bring elements together, erodes differences in politics and culture. There are four imperatives that drive McWorld. The market imperative focuses on how all countries are now vulnerable to the emergence of larger, transnational markets within which trade is free, currencies are convertible, or disappearing, (Euro replacing many European currencies) banking system is accessible to all, and contracts are enforceable under law. The problem according to Barber is that these open markets are eroding national sovereignty and give rise to entities that lack a meaningful national identity. This market imperative however reinforced the quest for international peace and stability as it is prerequisite for an efficient world economy. But, he says, the market imperative is not synonymous with the democratic imperative.

The next force that drives McWorld is the resource imperative, and by this Barber means that every country relies on other countries in acquiring natural or other resources. No one country is self-sufficient, and even Americans have to accept the fact that interdependence is inevitable. He also adds that some nations have almost nothing they need. (I wish he explained how it effects whether a nation is becoming a McWorld or a Jihad nation.)

The next is the information-technology imperative, and this is what makes it possible for nations to come together by reducing time and distance through modern innovations such as high-speed internet access. As it turns out scientific progress is dependent on open communication, collaboration and the exchange of information. In addition business, banking and commerce depend increasingly on information flow. Barber thinks that while individual nations speak their own languages, commerce and science speaks English. This statement has to be true, and it is contrary to what Micklethwait and Wooldridge says in their article. They say that globalization doesn’t necessarily mean Americanization. But the common use of the English language in the above mentioned fields indicate the opposite. The authors could say that this might be happening by a British influence, but I don’t think this is the case. It is in the US where the most international commerce, trade and scientific research takes place, and not Great Britain. Barber continues by saying that international commerce has affected the lives of everyday citizens all around the world. Well not all around the world, but in a significant part of it. National cultures are given a “face chiseled in Hollywood, on Madison Avenue and in Silicon Valley. The authors of The Globalization Backlash however think that it is not only the influence of the US, but there are other “clusters of excellence” in the world. I think that the point of this section would be to demonstrate that there are other clusters around the world, but they fail to do so. To return to the Barber article, he also mentions that culture can become more potent than armaments in spreading McWorld ideologies. Multinational companies such as McDonald’s and Coca Cola help create a global culture more effectively than military forces could ever do.

The last imperative is the ecological imperative, which states that we’re all affected by the quality of the environment, no matter where in the world we live. He implies that the international forces of McWorld’s markets contribute to the deterioration of the ecological system. There is a clear contradiction between this statement and what Micklethwait and Wooldridge believe. They refuse the idea that globalization would destroy the environment.

There are many international rules that companies abide by. Companies also realized that it is in their best interest to be environmentally conscious, partly because dirty companies loose customers, and partly because the regulations imposed are not that expensive to bear. They admit that some business operations can be harmful, but only on the short term. They also find that the tragedy of the commons is a rather alarming situation. For example no one country owns the oceans, therefore no one feels responsible for keeping them clean. But back to the Barber article. After he finishes describing the four imperatives of the McWorld, he goes on to explaining what he means by Jihad. The two, he says are the opposites of each other. As opposed to the globalized nature of McWorld, the Jihad consists of national states, subnational factions in rebellion against uniformity and integration. They are cultures and not countries, only dissenting minorities in war with globalization and traditional nation-states. War to them is not an instrument of policy, but an expression of community, an end in itself. Kurds, Basques, Quebecois and Catholics in Northern Ireland are all fighting for their independence. It may seem that they are the ones who believe in the ideas that Micklethwait and Wooldridge are trying to denounce. Globalization doesn’t mean the triumph of giant companies, in fact, it is the largest companies that suffer most in the globalized world. The authors cite the example of Motorola and Nokia, AT&T and GM. I don’t know that if they’d looked at not only a few companies but a thousand, the same could be said about the diminishing strength of the largest corporations? They add that the role of governments as opposed to corporations is showing a growing tendency in terms of regulating business practices. I mentioned earlier their point about how globalization is helping the environment instead of destroying it. Does globalization makes geography irrelevant? They say: not. It is true that distances are now much easier to conquer, geography still matters. For example where “clusters of excellence” are located is how the world economy organizes itself. Again, their examples are not sufficient. They only mention a couple of these locations and they are in the US. What about the rest of the world? Where are other “clusters of excellence?” Companies are accused of exploiting cheap labor in third world countries. Again, this is not the case. More important is that a labor force is educated and healthy than it is cheap. “Globalization means Americanization”. They say not necessarily, but admit that liberal virtues and individual rights are now prevailing around the world. These ideas however can be traced back to some of the great British thinkers such as Locke, Hume and Smith. I think when they say globalization doesn’t mean the Americanization of the popular culture, they’re wrong. It does mean it. I know, because I grew up in a country other than the US, but I’ve lived here in the last 5 years. So whenever I see a movie from my country, or visit websites, the influence of American culture is undeniable. People use American slang and other expressions, they consume American products, watch Hollywood movies and they follow the same fad diets as people here. Maybe the extent of the influence of American culture is not equal everywhere in the world, but it is definitely there.

As the authors state globalization doesn’t mean a race to the bottom in labor standards. Employers are not primarily concerned with the price of labor, what they look for is productive employees that are educated and skilled. As a proof they mention the fact that foreign direct investment is not pouring into countries with cheap labor, but as a matter of fact, the US is the greatest receiver of FDI. Well, this isn’t quite true, since from last year, the country that receives the most FDI is China and US is only the second while India is the third and is expected to catch up with the US in the near future. So this point in the article can easily be criticized. The fact is that China and India are attracting more and more foreign investment and this trend is not likely to be reversed in the near future. The next point is that globalization concentrates power in undemocratic institutions like the WTO and IMF. The authors deny it, saying that these organizations are much less powerful than people think. National governments are far more important on the international scene than global institutions. And the final point in the article is that globalization is not irreversible. It was reversed in the beginning of the 19th century, so why couldn’t it be reversed now? One if the examples they use is that the nature of globalization. It is not something stationary, rather a process that can be reversed. Also the human nature is one that cares more for its immediate surrounding than for something that is far away.

To conclude the comparison of the two articles we can say that the two poses two very different views as to where the globalized world is going. Barber doesn’t think that the globalized system is a democratic one, and its survivor is doubtful. Micklethwait and Wooldridge give a not so convincing argument as to the nature and future of globalization. They think that everything is good as it is, the only problem is that not everyone subscribes to its ideology. There are only minor problems that will eventually correct themselves.

As my last point I’d like to discuss the two opposing views regarding the extent and nature of globalization as found in the piece written by John L. Campbell. He criticizes the view of the globalization camp whose sympathizers say that the power of the individual states is diminishing as the intensity of globalization rises. Let me begin by discussing what the globalizers believe to be true, and then what Campbell thinks. First of all, as a mentioned before, globalizers think that the power of nation-states is being reduced significantly to a level where they rely on multinational corporations’ goodwill. In order for nations to be economically successful they have to open up for globalization, they can’t be protectionist, can’t impose taxes, and have a minimal or zero public spending. Citizens tend to not turn to the states with their problems, but rather seek the help of other international actors such as corporations or other organizations. This actually leads to a shift in loyalty, and explains political apathy in many countries. Nationalism is declining and a new type of patriotism emerges, where people feel they belong to a region instead of a single state. Multinational corporations supposedly threaten nations with moving their production to another country; therefore these pressured governments have to lower their corporate taxes if they want to keep in those investors. A combination of these forces leads to a “raise of a neo-liberal bottom”, where there are only a few policies that interfere with free market forces. When governments do interfere they asked to do so. Pressures of globalization are forcing nations to reduce taxes, spending, budget deficits, and other regulatory measures of their economies. If they don’t do so, they will pay the consequences in terms of high unemployment, rising interest rates and low economic growth. All in one, the globalizer camp believes that individual government institutions matter less and less in the determination of their political and economical performance. Campbell in his piece criticizes these believes and presents evidence that the extent of globalization has been exaggerated as has its effects, why the globalization thesis is overstated, he also gives evidence of several working mechanisms whereby states respond to globalization and finally he reflects on whether the globalization thesis might eventually be vindicated. Campbell starts out by arguing that the extent of globalization is far from what the globalization thesis suggests. Even though the world economy had become more open, it is less internationally integrated than many would saddest. He proves this by looking at the seventeen richest OECD countries’ average exports and imports as a percentage of GDP, international trade had barely increased since the 1960s. His data covers the years between 1960 and 1993. It would be interesting to see the data from this year, I bet it would show a little increase compare to ten years ago. He also suggests that while FDI increased sharply in the past twenty years, the majority of these investments concentrated on the triad region, further evidencing that companies are not shifting their production and investment into other countries. So even though FDI grew sharply, domestic investment remained the trend.

In the next section he criticizes the common belief that globalization has an adverse effect on state policies. States are competing in order to attract foreign investment by lowering their tax rates, thus precipitating a “race to the bottom.” This however hasn’t resulted in international convergence on relatively low tax rates, proving the assumption false. The tax rates have actually shown a steady increase among OECD countries. (But what about other, non-OECD countries?) Governments have continued to raise taxes so that the revenue can be spent on education, research and development and the like. Big businesses will then benefit from it by having access to an educated and healthy work force.

Campbell’s last point is that globalization doesn’t cause states to engage in economic deregulation and a more free-market model as more and more capital becomes available. The trend actually shows a reorganization and not a reduction in state power. States are not cutting taxes and spending and are not deregulating their economies as much as it is believed by the economic globalization thesis. There hasn’t been a convergence on the neo-liberal ideal as some might expect. These were the most important points I wanted to summarize. It is always useful to present both sides of an argument in order to gain a better understanding on issues. We shouldn’t however take all these ideas as they were the only legitimate ones. I believe there is always more to the truth than what be made to see. These articles I discussed in this paper all seem straightforward, therefore believable, but if we look at them more closely there can be certain inconsistencies discovered. Globalization is something that is happening around and with us whether we choose to accept it, deny it, or just go with the flow.

 

Sources:

Michael McFaul: Democracy Promotion as a World Value

Thomas Carothers: Democracy’s Sobering State

John L. Campbell: States, Politics, and Globalization: Why Institutions Still Matter

Benjamin R. Barber: Jihad vs. McWorld John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge: The Globalization Backlash

 

 

Printer Friendly Version or get for quick editing, exporting, sharing